40 ideas
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |